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A leading hypothesis to explain the social dysfunction in people with autism spectrum
disorders (ASD) is that they exhibit a deficit in reward processing and motivation specific
to social stimuli. However, there have been few direct tests of this hypothesis to date.
Here we used an instrumental reward learning task that contrasted learning with social
rewards (pictures of positive and negative faces) against learning with monetary reward
(winning and losing money). The two tasks were structurally identical except for the type
of reward, permitting direct comparisons. We tested 10 high-functioning people with ASD
(7M, 3F) and 10 healthy controls who were matched on gender, age, and education. We
found no significant differences between the two groups in terms of overall ability behav-
iorally to discriminate positive from negative slot machines, reaction-times, and valence
ratings, However, there was a specific impairment in the ASD group in learning to choose
social rewards, compared to monetary rewards: they had a significantly lower cumulative
number of choices of the most rewarding social slot machine, and had a significantly slower
initial learning rate for the socially rewarding slot machine, compared to the controls. The
findings show a deficit in reward learning in ASD that is greater for social rewards than for
monetary rewards, and support the hypothesis of a disproportionate impairment in social
reward processing in ASD.
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INTRODUCTION
Underlying the abnormal social behavior of autism may be social
motivation deficits. One prominent theory, the social motiva-
tion hypothesis, attributes the social dysfunction to a deficit in
reward processing and motivation specific to social stimuli (Daw-
son et al., 1998, 2002; Grelotti et al., 2002; Chevallier et al., 2012).
In this framework, early-onset impairments in social motivation
and attention set in motion developmental differences that ulti-
mately deprive the child of adequate social learning experiences,
which then leads to disruption in social skill and social cognition
developments. The downstream effects of these disruptions result
in the abnormal social behaviors of autism.
From the first year of life, individuals with autism spectrum
disorders (ASD) show reduced interest toward social stimuli like
faces, eye contact, and biological motion (Osterling and Dawson,
1994; Dawson et al., 1998; Klin et al., 2009). While non-ASD chil-
dren have increased pupillary diameter to happy faces with direct
gaze over averted gaze, children with ASD do not (Sepeta et al.,
2012). These differences in individuals with ASD may be reflective
of reduced reward motivation for social stimuli.
One key question about the motivation deficit is whether it is
caused by a specific impairment in the neural reward processing
of social stimuli, or if it reflects a more general deficit in learning
stimulus-reward associations. A few neuroimaging studies have
looked at social vs. non-social reward processing in ASD (Scott-
Van Zeeland et al., 2010; Dichter et al., 2012), and a recent issue of
the Journal of Neurodevelopmental Disorders has been devoted
entirely to this topic (Dichter and Adolphs, 2012). Scott-Van Zee-
land et al. (2010) reported that children with autism showed
generally impaired implicit reward learning to both money and
social stimuli, although the neural response to such stimuli mea-
sured with functional magnetic resonance imaging also showed a
disproportionate abnormality for the social stimuli in particular.
However, this study had several limitations. One limitation, com-
mon across many reward learning studies, was that only rewards
and neutral outcomes were investigated; there was no condition
for an aversive outcome. This raises the possibility that differ-
ences seen are due to attentional or arousal effects, which would
be greater for rewards than neutral outcomes. Our present study
(see below) included outcomes that were rewarding, neutral, or
aversive. Another important feature of the study of Scott-Van Zee-
land et al. (2010) is that the social outcomes were a person saying
that the choice was right or wrong, thus confounding reward value
with an error signal of whether the response made had been cor-
rect. These features of the task, perhaps together with the fact that
the participants were all children rather than adults, resulted in
a non-specific global deficit on task performance (for both social
and monetary versions) in the ASD group in that study (Scott-Van
Zeeland et al., 2010).
Another study (Dichter et al., 2012) found that the neural
response to monetary reward learning was abnormal in people
with ASD, but this abnormality disappeared during processing of
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interesting objects, possibly corresponding to the restricted inter-
ests common in the autism phenotype. However, this study had a
limitation in that there was a large IQ difference between subject
groups: the autism group had a nearly 20-point lower IQ than did
the healthy controls, making it difficult to assign group differences
to social reward processing rather than generally lower intellectual
functioning. In our present study, we carefully matched each ASD
participant one-for-one with each healthy participant, so that not
only were our groups matched closely on IQ, but so were individual
pairs of subjects. Finally, the study by Dichter et al. (2012) is some-
what different from ours in the processes that it investigated. It
used an incentive delay task that essentially taps Pavlovian reward
processing, whereas our task was instrumental. As in the Scott-Van
Zeeland et al. (2010) study, an emphasis of the study by Dichter
et al. (2012) was differences in regional brain activation from an
fMRI task. By contrast our present study aimed to design a sensi-
tive instrumental learning task that would show specific behavioral
differences – building a platform for future fMRI studies.
In contrast to the above studies, a recent study looking at mon-
etary rewards with event-related potentials (ERP) found typical
reward outcome processing in the ASD group (McPartland et al.,
2012). Similarly, Cascio et al. (2012) found that neural reward
response measured with fMRI to food images showed very sim-
ilar patterns of activation in both the ASD and control groups.
Again, these studies put an emphasis on brain-derived measures
rather than behavioral measures per se. The findings from these
last two studies are broadly consistent with our findings in the
present paper: non-social reward processing can be preserved in
high-functioning people with ASD.
The above studies point to some inconsistencies in the literature
in regard to reward processing in autism, leaving a key ques-
tion unanswered: are reward processing deficits in ASD domain-
general, or are they disproportionate for the social domain? Much
of the discrepancy in the literature may result from factors such
as inadequate matching of groups, from the various different
tasks that have been used, from a failure to carefully match dif-
ferent types of rewards, and in particular from the complexities
of obtaining neural measures (such as EEG and BOLD-fMRI) in
clinical populations. In regard to the latter issue, it is particularly
problematic to account for small differences in behavioral per-
formance in the scanner, since these will influence the observed
activations in complex ways. Our present study thus focused on a
purely behavioral set of measures, emphasizing a carefully matched
instrumental learning task that directly pitted monetary rewards
and punishments against social rewards and punishments.
We used a task that provided structurally identical process-
ing demands for social and non-social stimuli in the context of
decision-making (Lin et al., 2012); see Figure 1. The task assessed
the ability to learn to choose amongst options that were paired
with different types of rewards: monetary in one version of the
task, and social in a second version. By making the tasks otherwise
structurally identical, differing only in the type of reward outcome
obtained, we were able to provide a well-matched comparison to
investigate the above questions.
The task (Figure 1) is of interest also because we have pre-
viously shown that it engages overlapping neural substrates in
non-ASD populations (Lin et al., 2012). In line with a large litera-
ture on reward learning, the reward outcomes in the task activate
FIGURE 1 | ExperimentalTask. (A) Timeline of the monetary and social
reward trials. Choice trials paired a neutral slot machine with a valenced
slot machine. Trials were identical except for the nature of the outcomes:
monetary trials had a gain/loss of +$1, 0$, or −$1, whereas social trials
revealed happy, neutral, or angry faces accompanied with sound effects of
similar emotional valence. Specific slot machines were randomly assigned
to specific reward outcomes at the start of the experiment for each
subject, and distinct between monetary and social condition blocks. (B)
Distribution of outcomes for each slot machine. First row: negative
machine. Second row: positive machine. Bottom row: neutral machine. The
same distribution was used in the monetary and social conditions. Actual
appearance of the slot machines was randomly paired with a reward
outcome distribution, and distinct between monetary and social condition
blocks.
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the medial prefrontal cortex – and do so regardless of whether
the reward is monetary or social. Similarly, decision values of the
slot machines, and prediction errors that quantify the discrepancy
between expected and obtained outcomes, also activate overlap-
ping reward regions in the brain, regardless of whether the reward
is monetary or social. This prior finding in healthy individuals
using the same task helps to further constrain interpretations from
the behavioral data in the present study (see Discussion).
We tested 10 high-functioning people with ASD (7M, 3F)
and 10 healthy controls who were matched on gender, age, and
education, on an instrumental reward learning task that con-
trasted learning with social rewards against learning with mon-
etary rewards. In the social version of the task, outcomes were
smiling, neutral, or angry faces accompanied by matching sound
effects (happy, neutral, or angry voices). In the monetary version,
outcomes were monetary gains or losses.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-seven subjects participated in the study (mean
age= 22.4 years; range= 18–28). ASD subjects were matched one-
to-one with healthy controls to ensure the best possible compar-
isons between groups. Seven ASD subjects were excluded from
the analyses: four of these did not meet criterion on either the
monetary or social task even though they appeared to understand
the instructions; two did not understand the task instructions to
begin with and could not do the task; and one did the task in valid
fashion but failed to understand the subsequent rating instruc-
tions. Behavioral analyses reported are thus based on 20 subjects:
10 subjects with ASD (three female) and 10 age- and education-
matched controls (three female; Table 1). All ASD participants
met the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Revised 4th Edition diagnostic criteria for autism or Asperger
syndrome and met the cutoff scores for autism or Asperger syn-
drome on the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, Module 4
(Lord et al., 2000) and Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (Lord
et al., 1994; Table 1). All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and had no history of psychiatric or neurological
disease other than a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder for the
ASD participants. All healthy controls had a family history nega-
tive for an autism spectrum disorder. Participants gave informed
consent to participate in this study under a protocol approved by
the Caltech IRB.
TASK
Participants played two structurally identical versions of an instru-
mental learning task, one with monetary rewards, the second with
social rewards (Figure 1). A trial began with the display of two
visually distinctive slot machines, each associated with one of
three outcome distributions: mean-positive, mean-negative, and
mean-neutral.
All participants completed one social and one monetary block
of 100 trials each; block order was randomized between partici-
pants. At the beginning of each trial, participants were shown a
neutral slot machine paired with either the positive or negative
slot machine (50/50 probability with randomized order). Partici-
pants chose one by pressing a left or right button. Up to 2.5 s were
allowed for choice, followed by a uniformly blank screen displayed
for 1–5 s (flat distribution), followed by the reward outcome dis-
played for 1.5 s, followed by an inter-trial interval of a uniformly
blank screen displayed for 1–6 s (flat distribution). Participants
were not told the reward probabilities associated with each slot
machine and instead had to learn them by trial and error during
the task (a process likely to be implicit rather than explicit, given
the probabilistic nature of our task).
STIMULI AND REWARDS
The slot machines in both conditions were represented by car-
toon images of actual slot machines that varied in color and
pattern (Figure 1). The positive slot machine had mean-positive
outcomes, the negative slot machine had mean-negative out-
comes, and the neutral slot machine had mean-neutral outcomes.
Please note that outcomes were probabilistically associated with
the type of slot machine; thus, the neutral slot machine was in
fact associated with a 1/3 probability of getting either a positive,
negative, or neutral outcome (see Figure 1B for a breakdown of
how each type of slot machine was associated with each type of
outcome.)
Table 1 | Demographics and assessment background of participants.
n= Gender Age FSIQ Education (in years) SRS
ASD 10 7M, 3F 28 (3.1) 113 (4.7) 15 (0.7) 76 (9.7)
[18–45] [93–133] [10–18] [24–113]
Matched controls 10 7M, 3F 27 (3.1) 114 (13.4) 15 (0.6) 56 (15.6)
[17–44] [104–123] [12–18] [41–72]
ADI-A ADI-B ADI-C ADI-D ADOS-A ADOS-B ADOS-C ADOS-D
ASD 20 (1.8) 17 (1.5) 6 (0.9) 3 (0.5) 4.9 (0.5) 10.2 (1.4) 1 (0.2) 1.4 (0.4)
[12–28] [11–24] [2–12] [0–5] [3–7] [4–17] [0–2] [0–3]
FSIQ is full-scale IQ from theWechsler Adults IntelligenceTest (Wechsler, 1981). SRS is the social responsiveness scale (Constantino and Gruber, 2005), and ADI and
ADOS are the Autism Diagnostic Interview (Lord et al., 1994) and Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (Lord et al., 2000). Means, SD, and range are provided on
all subtests of the ADI and ADOS.
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In the social condition, reward outcomes were color pho-
tographs of unfamiliar faces from the NimStim collection
(Tottenham et al., 2009) showing either an angry (negative out-
come), neutral (neutral outcome), or happy (positive out-
come) emotional expression, presented together with emotionally
matched words played through headphones (normalized for vol-
ume and duration). Extensive prior piloting had demonstrated
the behavioral efficacy of these stimuli in reward learning, as also
evidenced by a prior study in an independent sample of healthy
participants (see Lin et al., 2012). In the monetary condition, the
positive outcome was a gain of one dollar (an image of a dollar
bill), the negative condition was a loss of one dollar (image of
a dollar bill crossed out), and the neutral condition involved no
change in monetary payoff (image of an empty rectangle). Sub-
jects were paid out the sum of their earnings at the end of the
experiment.
FACE RATINGS AND OTHER POST-TASK ACTIVITIES
At the end of the experiment, we asked subjects to rate the pleas-
antness of the social stimuli used in the imaging study. We were
interested in whether the two groups experienced the stimuli
similarly.
RESULTS
We compared a group of 10 high-functioning adults with ASD with
10 healthy controls matched on age, sex, and education (Table 1).
Our first check was to confirm the two subject groups had sim-
ilar subjective experiences of the face stimuli. Figure 2A plots
the pleasantness ratings for angry, happy, or neutral social stimuli
for each group. There were no statistically significant differences
in any of the valence categories [Angry: ASD −2.23 vs. Controls
−2.33; t (18)= 0.26, p= 0.80, Happy: ASD 2.25 vs. Controls 2.33;
t (18)=−0.22, p= 0.83, Neutral: ASD −0.13 vs. Controls 0.22;
t (17)=−0.87, p= 0.40] or in reaction-times [ASD Mean: 709 vs.
Controls Mean: 655; t (18)= 1.60, p= 0.13; Figure 2B].
Turning to the choice data from the main task, we found that
both groups reliably learned to select the slot machine associated
with the highest probability of a positive-valenced outcome for
both social and non-social rewards, and to avoid the slot machine
associated with the highest probability of a negatively valenced
outcome (Figure 3).
We next plotted the cumulative number of optimal choices trial
by trial. When collapsing over both social and monetary trials,ASD
and Controls performed indistinguishably (Figure 4A). We ran a
t -test comparing the slopes of the best fit-line of the two groups
and found no difference [Positive: ASD 0.91 vs. Controls 0.92;
t (17)=−0.38, p= 0.70; Negative: ASD 0.82 vs. Controls 0.84;
t (13)=−0.41, p= 0.68]. However, when we separated out social
and monetary trials, we found a double dissociation: ASD sub-
jects were better than control subjects on the monetary condition
but control subjects were better than ASD on the social condition
(Figures 4B,C). Since we observed more rapid and more stable
learning in the positive trials, we analyzed learning with two sepa-
rate ANOVAs. In the first, we ran a 2× 2 ANOVA of subject group
(ASD or Controls) and reward condition (monetary and social) for
the positive trials. We found no significant main effects of category
or group (all F ’s< 1, all p-values >0.6) but revealed a significant
group by condition interaction effect [F(1,1)= 7.44, p< 0.01]. A
t -test for differences of the slopes of the best fit-line for cumulative
positive trials revealed slopes for the control group were signifi-
cantly higher than the ASD group in the social condition [ASD:
0.86 vs. Controls: 0.97; t (10)=−2.35,p< 0.04]. Our second 2× 2
ANOVA of subject group (ASD or Controls) and reward condition
(monetary and social) with the negative trials did not reveal any
significant main or interaction effects. We, therefore, focus only
on the positive trials in the analysis that follows.
We found a similar result when we looked at total percent-
age of optimal slot machine selection at the end of the exper-
iment (Figure 5). A 2× 2 ANOVA of subject group (ASD or
Controls) and condition (monetary and social), pooling positive
and negative trials had no significant main effects of category or
group (all F ’s< 1, all p-values >0.4) but revealed a significant
group by condition interaction effect [F(1,1)= 4.20, p< 0.05].
There was a significant difference between ASD and Controls on
FIGURE 2 | Ratings of social stimuli. (A) Pleasantness ratings of the happy, neutral, and angry social stimuli. There were no significant differences between
groups on any of the categories. (B) Distribution of mean reaction-times between ASD and NT.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience October 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 143 | 4
Lin et al. Impaired social learning in autism
FIGURE 3 | Overall choice performance. Plot of group subject
choices across trials. Both groups reliably learned to select the slot
machine associated with the highest probability of a positive-valenced
outcome and avoid the slot machine associated with the highest
probability of a negative valenced outcome, in both monetary and
social conditions. The y -axis plots the percentage of total choices
within each group that selected the optimal slot machine on a given
trial.
FIGURE 4 | Cumulative choices for positively valenced conditions. (A)
Plot of cumulative optimal responses across trials in social condition. (B) Plot
of cumulative optimal responses across trials in the social condition. (C) Plot
of cumulative optimal responses across trials in the monetary condition. We
found a double dissociation, such that ASD participants cumulatively made a
greater number of optimal choices in the monetary condition, whereas
controls cumulatively made a greater number of optimal choices in the social
condition.
positive trials in the social condition [ASD: 0.85 vs. Controls: 0.96;
t (10)=−2.27, p< 0.05] but not in any of the other conditions.
Lastly, a qualitative look at individual subject data suggested dif-
fering rates of learning. To capture this in a quantitative manner,
we modeled each subject’s choice data with a probit regression,
using the slope estimate of the probit regression as a metric for
learning rate. We fit a probit regression through each subject’s
raw data appended with 10 alternating left and right trials at the
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FIGURE 5 |Total percentage of optimal slot machine selection (mean
and SEM) for positive trials in social and monetary condition.
beginning. We padded the start to give the model enough learning
trials since some subjects were able to identify the high value slot
machine within one or two trials. Visual inspection confirmed this
resulted in the best regression fit of the raw data.
We also checked whether the probit regression differentially
modeled one group’s data better than the other’s by comparing
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) scores between the two subject
groups and found no difference (all p-values> 0.05). After these
checks, we felt confident that the slope estimate from each subject’s
probit regression was an accurate reflection of learning rate.
Figure 6 plots the difference between the probit slope coeffi-
cient for positive trials in the monetary and social condition for
each subject. This showed an interesting group split. We quanti-
fied these findings with a Fischer’s exact test on the distribution
of greater monetary vs. social probit slope coefficient in ASD and
control subjects. We found there was a significant contingency
between subject group (ASD vs. Controls) and whether he/she
had a faster learning rate in the monetary over the social condi-
tion (p= 0.032). A greater proportion of participants in the ASD
group, than participants in the control group, had learning rates
that were faster for the monetary than the social condition. We also
ran correlations between the ADOS, ADI, SRS, FSIQ, Age, and the
social probit slope coefficients. None of these were statistically
significant.
DISCUSSION
We investigated the hypothesis that people with autism spectrum
disorder would show a disproportionate impairment in process-
ing social rewards. Using a reward learning task that had identical
structure, we administered two versions: one with social rewards,
and one with monetary rewards. We compared two groups of par-
ticipants: ASD and neurotypical controls, matched on age, gender,
and IQ.
In terms of overall ability behaviorally to discriminate positive
from negative slot machines in their choice behavior, reaction-
times, and valence ratings, both groups performed remarkably
similarly. Both groups learned to choose in favor of the slot
FIGURE 6 | Difference between monetary and social probit regression
coefficients (positive trials only). We fit probit regressions to each
subject’s choices on the positive trials in each condition. We then plotted
the difference between the fitted monetary and social coefficient for each
subject.
machine associated with positive outcomes, and to choose so as to
avoid the slot machine with negative outcomes; and both groups
learned to do so for either the monetary or the social condition.
The fact that both groups showed such similar choice behavior
and gave essentially identical valence ratings to the social stim-
uli provides strong evidence that our ASD group did not have a
basic perceptual impairment in recognizing the value of the social
stimuli (the emotional faces we used), nor did they have a basic
impairment in understanding the task or in showing motivated
behavior to obtain rewards. The highly similar overall behaviors
and ratings in the two well-matched groups provide a starting
point for discovering more specific dissociations, to which we
turn next.
When looking in more detail at the cumulative choices made,
and at the rate at which participants learned to choose optimally,
we found a disproportionate impairment in the ASD group in
learning to choose social rewards, compared to monetary rewards.
Over time, the ASD group selected significantly fewer of the most
rewarding social slot machine compared to the monetary slot
machine, and also had a significantly slower initial learning rate
for the socially rewarding slot machine, compared to the monetary
slot machine. This pattern of findings was particularly compelling
because it went in the opposite direction to what we found in the
controls. Whereas controls cumulatively made a greater number
of optimal choices in the social than the monetary condition, the
ASD group showed the converse pattern. Whereas controls gener-
ally learned faster in the social than the monetary condition, the
ASD group again showed the converse pattern. These dissociations
argue that the impairments in social reward processing found here
in the ASD group cannot be attributed simply to an overall greater
difficulty on the social than the monetary task. Rather, they appear
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to reflect a disproportionate impairment showing some domain-
specificity for social rewards in people with autism. The findings
demonstrate a subtle but specific behavioral insensitivity to social
rewards in ASD, consistent with prior hypotheses.
With respect to the final level of performance, the ASD par-
ticipants did not differ noticeably from the control group; they
differed only in the rate of learning. Thus, the most apparent differ-
ence was early on in the task, where there is a significant difference
in the slope of the learning curve in the ASD group compared to
controls. In the aggregate, this results in a difference in the total
cumulative number of correct trials. It leaves open the possibility
that there may also be a processing deficit later in the task, but
this could not be detected in our study due to inadequate power:
basically, both groups are near ceiling later in the task, once they
have learned. Thus, the impairment is only evident during learning
in the present study; we are hopeful that future fMRI data could
speak better to this point and possibly reveal processing differences
in ASD not only during the initial learning phase, but also during
later phases of the task.
An important limitation of the study is that our social stim-
uli are relatively artificial compared to real-life social encounters.
It will be important to extent these investigations to stimuli that
are more ecologically valid, and to learning situations more akin
to everyday life. Nonetheless, the positive findings of the present
study provide a particularly well controlled piece of evidence, and
it may well be that the impairments in processing real-life social
rewards are considerably more severe than what we found here.
Another limitation to note is that our participants with autism
were highly selected, limiting inference we can draw to the autism
population in general. Specifically, all our participants with ASD
were selected to be high-functioning, and furthermore they were
selected to ensure that they produced valid task performances and
could be reliably matched to healthy controls. This necessitated
excluding a total of seven participants with ASD from a total sam-
ple of 17, yielding our final sample of 10. On the one hand, our
approach ensures that the ASD group gave valid results and were
best matched to the controls (thus erring on the side of being
conservative in finding any group differences); on the other hand,
this approach likely reduced sensitivity to find abnormalities, and
would likely fail to find impairments that are present in the ASD
population at large, especially if lower functioning individuals are
included.
Future studies should extend these investigations to examin-
ing the underlying neural substrates. As our behavioral task has
in fact been used in conjunction with fMRI (Lin et al., 2012),
it lends itself well to model-based fMRI of reward learning and
could be used to probe neural differences in ASD. Preliminary
investigations along these lines are currently underway in our lab-
oratory, but may require larger sample sizes to achieve the requisite
power.
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